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ANDREW K. DRAGUN* and VICTOR GLEESON**

From Water Law to Transferability
in New South Wales***
ABSTRACT
Water management in Australia is at the crossroads.The largest
share of the nation's regulated water supply is used in low value
irrigationwhile large new demands in industry and the cities cannot
be fulfilled as a consequence of government funding restrictions.
Despite a good deal of discussion and evidence on the merits of
water markets, particularly in terms of achieving an efficient reallocation of water from irrigation to higher valued uses, the fact is
that institutionaldevelopments have been minor.
The principal legislation in New South Wales, together with a
series of significant cases, are outlined to illustratethe complexities
of the contemporarysystem of water administrationin Australia. The
difficulties of institutionalizingan operationalwater market are then
highlighted together with feasible alternatives and impacts to the
direct water market.
INTRODUCTION

The Pressure for Markets in Water
A great deal has been written on the advantages of water markets in
both Australia and the United States. Much of the discussion-particularly

in Australia-has focused on the obstreperousness of the prevailing administrative regulation of water use-and the contrasting great benefits
of a market approach to water management, emphasizing transferability. t
Currently there is much interest in rationalizing the water industry in the
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urban sector of Australia. The cities of Perth and Newcastle have introduced wide ranging pricing reforms, with further innovation portended
in Sydney, South Australia and Victoria. 2 However, the largest portion
(70 percent), of the nation's regulated water supplies are still to be found
in irrigation where active reform does not appear to have permeated. 3
It is well established that the large volumes of water committed to
irrigation generate little if any financial or social benefit, whereas reform
which enabled the transfer of water to urban and industrial users could
eliminate significant public subsidies and provide real social benefits, as
well as eliminate the widespread environmental problems associated with
irrigation.4 The ultimate threat is that if the current urban sector water
reforms-particularly in the area of pricing-are applied directly to the
irrigation sector, then farmers will suffer a good deal of hardship and
dislocation.
Recognizing this possibility, much attention has been given to the
prospect for achieving efficiency in the Australian water industry through
the agency of water markets.' The consequence of this discussion, which
has continued for decades, has not been felt at the policy level where
only limited transfer arrangements are found in New South Wales (NSW)
and South Australia, and then only for irrigation.
With few exceptions, 6 there has been no concerted analysis of the
existing circumstances and conditions of water allocation and management in Australia, particularly in connection with the economic principles
of transferability and markets for water. Analysis of the water industry
can provide insights into the institutional evolution of this industry, since
the existing legislative structure has not been immune from the political
maneuvering of a strong and vociferous irrigation lobby over the years.
The analysis also provides a springboard for considering reform in the
industry.
This paper focuses on the water legislation of NSW-but recognizes
the comparability and constraints in the other states.
THE QUESTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WATER
If there had ever been rights in water that could be considered as
analogous to those of ownership of chattels or perhaps real property, this
2. Perth Metropolitan Water Supply and Drainage Board, Metropolitan Water Board Development
Plan 1982-1987 (1982); Broad, Water Pricing, The Hunter Experience, in Hunter District Water
Board (1984).
3. Australia Department of Resources and Energy, Water 2000: Agricultural Water Demand and
Issues (Consultants Report No. 5, 1983).
4. Dragun, Musgrave & Gleeson, The Economics of Water Use in the Hunter Region (1986); B.
Davidson, supra note 1; Randall, supra note 1.
S. Randall, supra note 1; B. Davidson, supra note I.
6. Davis, Australian andAmerican WaterAllocation Systems Compared, 9 B. C. Indus. & Com.
L. Rev. 647 (1968); S. Clark & I. Renard, The Law of Allocation of Water for Private Use (1972).
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study would be greatly simplified. The rights to water recognized at
common law in Australia, were mainly restricted to those relating to
riparians. Ownership of water was not recognized even for the riparian,
and instead the common law wrestled with notions that made water available to riparians (and possibly others) without granting title as such. The
closest concept to effective ownership of water was to be found in the
common law attitude to a landholder's control of groundwater in undefined channels. However, even here the opportunity to use water in a full
ownership manner remained only while the groundwater was within the
confines of the land in question.
Indeed, at various times the property rights "structure" of water has
been described as res communes or property held in common; res nullius
or unowned property; bonum vacans and publici juris. Blackstone's observation that "water is a moveable wandering thing, and must of necessity continue common by the law of nature," although written in the
eighteenth century, remains the dominating principle for excluding private
ownership of water. Thus, if water is not owned in common, it would
be considered to be a resource in vacant possesgion or without ownership,
but never would it be conceived of as privately owned.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, legislative innovation
throughout Australia initiated dramatic changes in the control of water.
The debates occurring at this time placed considerable emphasis on the
point that the law had never recognized ownership in water, thus responding to the alternative suggestion that control of water should henceforth be vested in the Crown in the form of the respective states.
While private ownership of water has never been an accepted notion
in Australia, there was nonetheless a recognition that riparians had certain
entitlements of water use which were distinguished from traditional rights-associated with ownership of chattels-by identifying such entitlements
as usufructuary rights. Within this expression is concealed the many
dilemmas of determining a right to use water in but a passing fashion,
with the obligation to allow the water to proceed to other riparians who
also shared this right.
The nineteenth century pronouncements of riparian rights accepted that
ordinary use (traditional domestic activities) was acceptable, but other
extraordinary uses should only be permissible if no sensible diminution
of quantity or quality of water arose. If that should occur lower riparians
could well have an action against such use if damage could be identified.
The flexibility inherent in such a formula for rights has much to recommend it. It was however, a flexibility that required clarification if the
formula was to survive. The decisive issues were to determine what was
ordinary use and what constituted a sensible diminution of quantity or
7. W. Blackstone, Commentries on the Laws of England (T. Cooley, 4th ed., 1884).
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quality. With ordinary use the consumption of the entire flow could be
permitted and hence any tendency to expand the scope of this notion
could have a most adverse effect on the theoretical rights of lower riparians. Such an expansion is reflected in the manner in which ordinary
use became reasonable use in the American adaptation of the common
law, with a dramatic impact on the distribution of rights between riparians.
In a similar vein, any generosity by the courts in their perspective of
what constituted a sensible diminution of flow had the effect of expanding
the scope of extraordinary uses of water. Despite these tensions, industrial
development in England led to litigation on quality aspects where quantity
issues seemed to provide few difficulties. Thus, in areas where the quantity
of water was of importance, there was a need for greater specificity in
the law.
Aside from the vagueness in the definition of riparian rights, a major
problem from the viewpoint of equitable and/or efficient distribution of
water was that, by definition, the rights were restricted to riparians. Water
use by riparians was not related to size of land holding nor to length of
the river holding, leading to a range of anomalies. Alternatively, nonriparians had no rights at all and while supplies were often negotiated
with riparians, any use was associated with a degree of uncertainty due
to the ordinary/extraordinary use limitations which could be applied, as
well the fact that such a user could not take direct action against any
upper riparian whose activities were deleterious to the quantity or quality
of water.
At common law, the rules relating to groundwater in undefined channels
contrasted significantly with those relating to a riparian. A land holder
was permitted unlimited use of groundwater, even to the extent of exhausting it. The only restriction on use was related to interference with
quality, where an activity which led to a diminution of groundwater quality
under another's land could be the basis of a right of action. Hydrological
realities are ignored by these distinctions.
Substantial modification to the common law has been undertaken in
Australia as a consequence of the interest in regulating water flow. Legislation and civil law interpretation have placed the use of water in the
public domain so that the government of the day, through its relevant
agencies and departments, is responsible for and has jurisdiction over the
use of water. Subsequently, the rights or entitlements of individuals to
use water are specifically determined and controlled according to particular provisions of legislation or certain administrative processes.
That water use was under the jurisdiction and control of government
through its public authorities was recognized by Mr Justice Fullagar in
the High Court who opined in connection with the Water Act 1912 (NSW)
that:
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the real object of (the legislation) was to enable the Crown, in a
country in which water is a comparatively scarce and important
commodity, to exercise full dominion over the water of rivers and
lakes and to undertake generally the conservation and distribution of
water. For the attainment of that object it was not necessary to destroy
anybody's rights, but it was necessary to give the Crown, or to some
statutory authority, overriding rights to which private rights must, if
need arise, give way.
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE
Throughout Australia, the common law rights to water use enjoyed by
land holders were subjected to legislative modification which in many
ways amounted to the obliteration of individual rights.
For most of Australia, a denial of traditional riparian rights was of little
impact since the granting of title to land adjoining watercourses had
excluded the actual bank, thus denying a land holder the ripa (bank) from
which riparian rights devolved. Even where riparian rights had already
arisen, virtually by inadvertence in NSW, the impact of legislation was
to modify the common law rights of a riparian by vesting in the Crown
general control of water, with limited but quite specifically defined rights
granted to riparians. These rights have some approximation to the ordinary
use category recognized at common law. Thus, specific entitlements are
given to landowners on a stream to use water for domestic and stock
purposes and also for very limited irrigation. These entitlements are more
specific and tend to be more restricted than those which would be available
to a riparian at common law under the category of ordinary use.
THE NSW WATER ACT, 1912
The Water Act, 1912 of NSW, has a framework similar to acts in
operation elsewhere in Australia-and consideration of this act in detail
provides a useful foundation for the analysis of water use in Australia.
This act has now been brought into the twentieth century with a plain
English rewrite in 1987.
The opening thrust of this act is to place control of water in the hands
of the Crown by stating:
The right to the use and flow and to the control of the water in all
rivers and lakes which flow through, or past, or are situated within
or are adjoining the land of two or more occupiers, and the water
contained in or conserved by any works shall, subject only to the
instructions hereinafter mentioned, vest and be deemed to have vested
in the (Water Resources) Commission for the benefit of the Crown.
(section 4A[11).
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The restrictions referred to emerge in relation to the various rights
granted by other acts such as those to specified Water Boards and also
the sundry rights given to local government bodies.
Section 7 of the act defines the rights that an occupier of land, where
the land forms the bank of a river or a lake, has to water in quite specific
terms with no need to seek permission from the Commission by the way
of a license. As previously mentioned, these rights relate somewhat, albeit
in a restrictive fashion, to the rights once recognized at common law for
ordinary use by a riparian. The uses are restricted to domestic purposes;
the watering of stock; irrigating gardens of less than 2 hectares for private
use only; and irrigating land for growing fodder crops for animals kept
solely in connection with the use of the dwelling-house, again with the
limit being 2 hectares (section 7[l]). A further significant restriction on
the common law approach to a riparian's ordinary use, is that the commission can-following issue of appropriate notice-suspend or modify
rights to such water use if the commission is satisfied that the water is
being wasted or that there is an actual or threatened shortage of water in
the river or lake (section 7[2]).
Reference is still frequently made in the act to riparians and riparian
uses. The limits placed by section 7 on water use by landholders on the
banks of streams, means that the modem equivalent to the common law
ordinary use of water permitted to riparians is restricted to specific tasks
and may be suspended altogether in some circumstances. The extraordinary use that was permitted at common law to riparians has no equivalent
in the Water Act in that such uses are not permitted as of right. Instead
the user needs to apply to the Water Resources Commission (sections 10,
12), and/or the Land and Environment Court needs to be satisfied before
a license to remove water is granted (section 11). Such licenses are
permitted for a limited time and where they expire, a similar process of
application and consideration must be followed in order to gain renewal
(section 14).
During the currency of a license, it is possible for the commission,
after serving due notice, to revoke, suspend or modify the license if
excess water has been taken, or if water is being used in an unauthorized
fashion or is being wasted (section 17A [1]). Further, the commission
has power to suspend or modify a license or reduce the quantity of water
that may be taken "if in the opinion of the Commission there are circumstances which render it necessary or expedient" (section 17A [21).
With licenses being subject to such controls by the legislation, they are
more appropriately characterized as privileges than rights. Although neither the legislation itself nor recent developments in administrative law
would permit licenses to be taken away merely on the whim of an ad-
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ministrator, licenses have nothing of the proprietorial permanence of
riparian rights at common law.
A major impediment to sensible distribution of surface water under the
common law rules was that riparians alone had rights to water. By contrast, it is not a requirement of the act that applicants for licenses be
occupants of a stream bank. In fact, the act makes it possible for a person
who requires occupation of land in order to construct supply works to
apply for an order from the commission permitting the construction and
use of such works (section 13A). Disaffected parties to proposed activities
of this type have resorted to the Land and Environment Court.
The legislation thus brings about major changes from the common law
position. Riparians and non-riparians are placed on a similar footing.
Other than the limited use now available to riparian uses under section
7, there are no unimpeachable rights available to anyone. The act requires
applicants for licenses to provide details to the Commission on the proposed means of taking water, estimations of quantity of water to be used
and the rate at which it is to be taken, along with particulars on how the
water is to be used.
In determining when licenses are to be granted, there are no specific
criteria applied by the commission. However, there are procedural steps
that must be followed by the commission. For example, there is a need
to publicize in a specific way that an application for a license has been
made. Any person whose interests are affected by an application may
lodge an objection with the commission. If an objection is upheld by the
commission resulting in a refusal to grant an application for a license,
the applicant is enabled the discretion to appeal to the Land and Environmental Court. Where an objector is dissatisfied with the commission's
decision to grant a license, or when an applicant is dissatisfied with the
conditions set in a license, an inquiry may be held either by the local
Land Board or by a stipendiary magistrate. An appeal to the Land and
Environment Court may follow this procedure also.
It is noteworthy that if these appeal mechanisms are invoked, there is
a lack of specific criteria by which these bodies determine whether a
license should or should not be granted, or should be granted subject to
limitations. Section 13A, which relates to a person requiring occupation
of another's land, contains a provision that the interests of riparian occupiers will not be unreasonably affected by granting the application.
While this may relate more to the land than the water use of riparian
occupiers, this provision highlights the lack of similar provisions elsewhere and also focuses on whether a license is granted merely to use
water. Policies adopted by the commission on criteria to be satisfied before
licenses are issued are presumably subject to change according to water
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availability and perceptions of efficiency and equity. These policies may
well be put by the commission to the local land boards, or to the stipendiary magistrate if a hearing is required. The absence of guidelines throws
the courts into a creative role, which warrants some examination.
DISPUTED APPLICATIONS
The main provisions of the Water Act, involving the granting of licenses
to permit construction of works on streams as well as the removal of
water, have remained unamended since the inception of the act in 1912.
Procedures for objecting to the granting of licenses, the water use conditions specified in a license, or for a disappointed applicant to appeal
against the refusal to grant a license, have remained unaltered although
there have been some changes in the bodies responsible for various functions. The judicial body responsible for resolving appeals has been the
Supreme Court from time to time, although the Land and Environment
Court deals with most appeals.
Various decisions have noted that section 11 of the act-the principal
provision relating to licenses to construct works and remove water from
streams--does not specify the principles to be applied. In this regard,
Mr. Justice Hardie in Robson v. Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission Robson v. Water Conservation & Irrigation Comm'n said:
there are indications in the Act that the main question for determination is what is necessary or desirable in the public interest; the
problem is frequently one of balancing a known advantage or benefit
to one riparian holder, or to a group of riparian holders, against an
apprehended or possible disadvantage or prejudice to other riparian
holders. 8
In establishing the balance, the rights conferred under section 7 for
domestic and stock watering purposes are initially given great weight.
Thus, in Robson v. Water Conservation and Irrigation, Justice Hardie
was concerned that the granting of a license under section 11 did not
prejudice the enjoyment of persons downstream from the applicant when
those persons (as objectors) had "higher rights under Section 7." Similarly, in Bathurst Pastures Protection Board v. Kyalla Investment Co.
Ltd.,' an application to construct two dams was permitted because there
seem to be no appreciable prejudice to lower riparians and the proposal
would have less impact than use permitted under section 7. Here the
proposed use of the water in the dams was for stock watering, domestic
purposes, and a small amount of irrigation. Thus, the proposal resulted
8. Robson v. Water Conservation & Irrigation Comm'n, 36 N.S.W. L.V.R. 57, 60 (1957).
9. Bathurst Pastures Protection Bd v. Kyalla Inv. Co., 21 N.S.W. L.V.R. 8 (1942).
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in water conservation which the court considered should be encouraged.
It has frequently been stated that apportioning the water between competing users is to be done in an equitable fashion. In the absence of any
guidelines on what determines an equitable distribution, various approaches have been taken. In Trustees of the Estate of Late Smith Pollock
and Others v. Considine,"° there had been changes in water flows over
the years through creation of artificial works. An equitable distribution
in this case was established to be one based on what the parties had
received under natural conditions in past years.
However, to resort to natural conditions in the past would not necessarily resolve matters and could often lead to a begging of the question.
In the Smith Pollock Estate case, unauthorized activities of the parties in
the past had so muddled issues that restoration of natural conditions was
attractive as being less value-laden than bringing back some intermediate
situation.
In other cases, the matter of an equitable arrangement generally involved placing limits on the use of water during times when it was in
short supply. Thus, conditions are often set so that only a limited amount
of water is retained. This can be done by setting dam water levels and
limiting pumping rates or by ensuring that a minimum flow rate is maintained. This often involved obliging a licensee to maintain a flow that
would not result in a downstream user from being completely deprived.
In GibraltarPty. Ltd. v. FairymeadSugar Co. Ltd.," various suggestions were made on how a licensee should maintain a flow. The conclusion
Justice Hardie reached attempted to avoid the wasting water and burdensome monitoring while ensuring a continuous supply of water to downstream users. This involved placing conditions on the license which specified
a minimum quantity of water to be maintained, which the Water Resources
Commission could order to be released when it was of the view that
downstream riparians or the public interest justified it.
Safeguards ensuring a minimum flow are not enough in themselves to
guarantee supply to a downstream licensee and the focus turned to whether
a proposed use was not reasonable, given the number of other potential
users. An argument put forward in the case of Water Conservation and
Irrigation Comm'n v. New South Wales PastoralCo. Ltd., 2 against the
use of water for commercial fodder growing, was rejected by Justice
Roper. He expressed the view that conservation of fodder for use in times
of scarcity is a beneficial activity of the greatest importance in the rural
economy of the state. It remained so whether the fodder is conserved for
10. Trustees of the Estate of Late Smith Pollock v. Considine, 20 N.S.W. L.V.R. 8 (1941).
11. Gibraltar Pty. Ltd. v. Fairymead Sugar Co., 36 N.S.W. L.V.R. 32 (1957).
12. Water Conservation & Irrigation Comm'n v. New South Wales Pastoral Co., 24 N.S.W.
L.V.R. 54 (1945).
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use by the grower himself, or for the use of others without. However,
Justice Roper stated that it was appropriate to consider whether an applicant for a license would obtain a disproportionately large supply of
water, when the available supply and demand upon it are properly considered. Although he thought that this principle had not been established
and thus the license should be granted, Justice Roper referred to the
commission's role in the following terms:
The Commission, as the guardian of the public interest has the responsibility of ensuring an equitable apportionment of the water
available. It is concerned to meet the reasonable requirements of as
many people as possible and to adjust the claims upon the available
supply as fairly as possible to each of the claimants. Its objection
that an applicant would, if his application were granted, get more
than his share of the limited supply must be given effect too in my
opinion if it is made out, and the opinion of the officers on the matter
must be given very great weight."3
Reflections on public interest considerations are found in Braithwaite
v. Shoalhaven Shire Council.'4 In this case, the competing interests arose
between the Shire Council, which had applied for a license to construct
a dam to supplement the shire's water supply, as against the objectors'
interest in having the water remain available for potential use in mining
operations which they hoped to re-establish. Justice Hardy concluded that
the public interest in safeguarding and securing the shire's water supply
was clearly paramount to the speculative public interest in re-establishing
a mining operation which had been inactive for over 60 years and which
might not materialize.
Much of the argument in Braithwaite's case focused on whether reasonable alternative supply sources of water for the shire existed. Additionally, the growth in demand for water within the shire was weighed
against the likelihood of mining operations recommencing. Thus, the
Court was not called on to make a decision on the possible "public
interest" aspects of supply of water for urban use against a mining use.
This issue is largely academic because of the various legislative provisions
(in particular section 4A(2)(b) of the Water Act) and the political considerations that place the requirements of bodies responsible for supplying
water for urban purposes above those of other users. Nonetheless, it is
the only known case where the issue has been litigated and is of interest
on this basis.
Public interest considerations are also to be found in F.W. Hughes Pty.
13. Id.
14. Braithwaite v. Shoalhaven Shire Council, 44 N.S.W. L.V.R. 5 (1965).
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Ltd. v. Water Conservation and IrrigationComm'n. ' Whereas most litigation has focused on clearly discernible interest groups opposing an
applicant, the principal concern of this case was the potentially deleterious
effects on the environment through the applicant's proposal. The commission claimed that the growth of cumbungi in the catchment area could
impair the capacity of the creek to carry drainage water. Evidence was
given that this could upset future schemes for the use of the water. Mr.
Acting Justice Roper (as he then was) regarded circumstances which
would arise in the immediate future to be material matters and decided
against the applicant. Thus, objections from those with a direct interest
at the time were not the sole matters of concern.
Similarly, in a later case, Justice Else-Mitchell in The Grove (Cootumundra) Pry. Ltd. v. Landgrove Pty. Ltd., 6 regarded soil erosion control
as a possible aspect of water conservation (an aspect mentioned specifically in section 10(1)(a) of the act) or alternatively as a matter to be
taken into account in determining the total public benefit of work. In the
Grove case, the soil conservation aspect was used as an argument in favor
of an application for a license, however the dicta on public benefit (or
interest) aspects, seem to pertain to objections to the grant of a license
with similar force.
In Thorpes Ltd. v. Water Conservation and Irrigation Comm' n, ' the
public interest matters tend to be focused more specifically on the interests
of adjoining land owners. Approval was refused for maintaining levee
banks which had been erected to lessen flooding of the applicant's land,
because such banks had resulted in greater flooding to adjoining land and
had damaged that land through the dumping of soil and stones.
Although the courts have considered the general public interest, no
definite guidelines have been specified. Nor has any specificity emerged
in assessing the competing interests of immediate users. The view of the
Water Resources Commission has been given much weight. As stated in
F. W. Hughes Pty. Ltd. v. Water Conservation and IrrigationComm'n,'"
in the context of disputes, the commission's interests are twofold-a
general interest arising through the general right conferred on it by section
4A of the act, and a particular interest arising through the potential impact
of a license application on works directly under its control. Section 4A(1),
which vests in the commission control of water, states that the commission
may take such measures "as may be thought fit" (or as may be prescribed)
15. F.W. Hughes Pty. Ltd. v. Water Conservtion & Irrigation Comm'n, 16 N.S.W. 15 L.VR.
11(1937).
16. The Grove (Cootumundra) Pty. Ltd. v. Landgrove Pty. Ltd., 3 N.J.W.R. #333 (1970).
17. Thorpes Ltd. v. Water Conservation and Irrigation Comm'n, 36 N.S.W. L.V.R. 62 (1957).
18. F.W. Hughes Pty. Ltd. v. Water Conservation and Irrigation Comm'n, 16 N.S.W. L.V.R. 11
(1937).
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"for the conservation and supply of. . . water . . and its more equal
distribution and beneficial use." As the court stated in the F.W. Hughes
case, "[it may be assumed that in almost all cases the grant of the license
is advantageous and so desirable from the applicant's point of view; (the
question then being under Section 11) whether it is desirable in the public
interest that the rights of the Commission should be cut down." Litigation
in this area exemplifies some of the problems that can arise and reflects
on some issues of fine tuning, but does little in specifying criteria on
what constitutes more equal and beneficial use of water.
APPLICATIONS FOR LICENSES
The cases described above illustrate the lack of specificity of the general
provisions of the Water Act on matters relating to the granting of licenses
and permits as well as the quantities which may be allocated. Division
4 of the act, which permits the establishment of joint water supply authorities and group licenses controlled by Management Boards, provides
a degree of autonomy in distributing water amongst the individual members in such arrangements. Commission approval is nonetheless required
for the apportionment of water within the authority or group license and
license disputes are heard by either a local land board or a stipendiary
magistrate. However, recommendations to the commission on the question of apportionment between members of the Authority can be made
independently as specified in Section 20 CA(4)(f)(i).
The provisions of the act which bring some quantitative specificity to
the allocations of water are to be found in Division 4B, Volumetric Water
Allocations Schemes, which were introduced in 1977. Under these provisions an area can be declared to be subject to a volumetric allocation
scheme by an order of the Governor published in the Gazette. Following
declaration, the commission is charged with the task of preparing a scheme
to assess the total quantity of water available for apportionment to license
holders, which then determines the maximum quantity that may be taken
by the individual license holders. In making this determination, the commission may fix differing quantities of water per hectare according to the
type of irrigation that is authorized, or fix maxima for quantities used for
other purposes. The commission may subsequently make a proportional
reduction in entitlements in periods of water shortage or increase allotments in times of surplus.
Whilst the provisions of the act are not explicit on the areas of jurisdiction, the locations that have been selected for Volumetric Water Allocation Schemes are those where the water is controlled by being
downstream from a reservoir. In practice, the commission sets the number
of irrigated hectares per person and the volume of water per hectare for
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each type of authorized irrigated crop. Such practices lend some objectivity to allocation and on first impression appear to resolve issues of
equity between potential water users. However, there is one potential
source of tension which arises through the possibility for the granting of
new licenses. Under section 20AB, new licenses may be granted to
persons who are to draw from a source covered by volumetric allocation,
with the amount to be apportioned from the total quantity of water available, in the same manner as the original users within the scheme. These
grants will obviously reduce the amount of water available to each original
user. Such reductions could be in absolute terms, or could be manipulated
as a reduction in the reliability of supply. Thus, the scheme may satisfy
the requirements of equity between authorized users, while leaving open
the question of how many persons share what is available.
PRIORITIES BETWEEN WATER USERS
The act does not provide a mechanism for assigning priority between
new water uses as long as existing uses are not impinged upon. However,
provisions do exist under the act for volumetric adjustments of allocation
according to certain circumstances (section 20X) and for the priority of
specific uses under restrictive conditions (section 22B(4)). This final section specifies that suspensions under restriction are determined in accordance with a fixed priority order.
Thus, suspensions are directed to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
rights
(d)

licenses for uses other than domestic and stock supply;
rights for irrigation;
rights for purposes other than irrigation and domestic supply,
for stock supply and rights held under section 7; and
rights for domestic supply and rights held under section 7.

While section 22B(4) was specifically designed for circumstances of
restriction, its impact has been instrumental as a basis of water allocation
priorities. Currently it appears that domestic water supply will receive
first priority under the act and that subsequently, industrial users will be
given priority ahead of agricultural users.
The general principles of water allocation may be summarized as follows:
(a) any use of water, even a relatively low priority use, may be
sanctioned as long as it does not deleteriously impinge on some
existing use of water regardless of priority;
(b) where several water uses are under consideration which impinge on each other while not affecting other uses, it appears that
the higher priority use will be favored; and
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(c) under conditions of restriction, the higher priority use will be
favored regardless of precedence.
The matter of water rates and charges (sections 137-143), is decidedly
vague. While procedures are specified, the act is evasive as far as the
actual determination of monetary values.
THE TRANSFER OF WATER LICENSES
Licenses which are determined on the basis of volumetric allocation
are reasonably amenable to transfer. The possibility of quantifying rights
with precision is far greater under the volumetric allocation scheme than
in circumstances where permitted usage is described in more general
terms such as land area. Even with volumetric allocation, it is possible
under the act for the number of licenses to be increased. In this way, the
apportionment to each license holder can be decreased, implying a lack
of security for license holders. Policy decisions by the commission to
avoid issuing new licenses in the absence of increased water supply can
lessen uncertainty in this area, but the tradeoff is the inequity to potential
licensees who could use water more beneficially than current licensees.
The commission may notify potential users that no further licenses are
to be granted for the period of the notice according to section 20Y.
Reliability of supply is a more serious obstacle to the transfer of licenses. With a set storage capacity, which may or may not receive replenishment over a specified time, a choice can be made by the commission
as to the amount of water which is to be distributed. The greater the
allocation, the lower the probability of actual delivery. If water supply
is considered relative to the amount directed to valued uses rather than
the volume being washed through the system in stream flow, then high
allocations with low levels of reliability will lead to greatest use of available river yield. However, a more modest allocation with greater reliability would be less "efficient" from this viewpoint, but could well lead
to avoidance of crop losses.
If water transfers occurred between activities where the impact of low
reliability was about the same, then no great impediment arises. If, however, the transfer is to an activity where reliability is of more importance,
then some volumetric difficulties will arise. The policy of the commission
to prohibit allocations to permanent plantings (where the reliability needs
to be high) in most irrigation districts, reflects this state of affairs.
Some informal transfers of water rights within the irrigation sector have
occurred over the years, with considerable resistance from the commission. Irrigatbrs wishing to leave the industry could sell their land with
the expectation that the original license would be renewed in the name
of the purchaser. Failure of such renewal would of course result in de-
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capitalization of the irrigated land, causing undue hardship on original
irrigators. In practice, water is transferred within the irrigation sector
encumbered by land transfers, where a vendor sells licensed land to
another landholder and subsequently re-purchases the same land, less the
license. Under the volumetric allocation scheme, allocated water could
be used on any entitled land so that inter-farm adjustments were possible.
Hence, water transfers always required some form of land transfer. However, water supply is not area-specific as long as the land is entitled, and
very much more land is entitled to be irrigated than is irrigated from
actual licensed allocations.
The feature of such transfers is that the water transaction is contingent
on a land transfer and the transferred water being used to irrigate the
same area of land or some other entitled irrigation land. Fundamentally,
this mechanism did not enable the transfer of water from irrigation to
any other water-using activity. Significantly, transfers within any other
water use sector or between any other activities are not known and do
not appear to be provided for within the act.
In 1983, the commission announced that transfers of a limited and
short-term nature would be permitted. The main feature of the "Temporary Water Transfer Scheme" is that direct water transfers between
licensed irrigators are enabled without the previous arbitrary use of land
transfers. The transfer is only allowable for the given season and the
magnitude of the transfer is restricted to the differential between the initial
allocation and 100 percent of the allocation. Certain transfer fees and
restrictive operational conditions are applied. The general theme of the
Temporary Scheme was to provide greater flexibility to water users where
"announced allocations" were low (generally less than 30 percent). Consequently, some doubt exists regarding whether the scheme will be continued, particularly where "announced allocations" approach the upper
end of the range. Temporary schemes have occurred in subsequent years.
Generally, while the temporary scheme provides some flexibility over
a given season, which is defined by the licensed allocation, the volume
restrictions and the lack of permanency limit the utility of this proposal.
The most significant discrepancy, however, is the restriction of the scheme
to irrigation at the expense of other water users. South Australia also has
a similar scheme in place for irrigation.
Several other classes of water transfer can be identified in New South
Wales. The first occurs in the Joint Water Supply Schemes, as an extension
of the land transfer mechanism. In this case, water can only be transferred
accompanying the usual process of land transfers. However, the Water
Authority is responsible for recording and reporting transfers and does
so only periodically to the Water Resources Commission.
The Private Irrigation Districts, constituted under the Private Irrigation
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DistrictsAct, 1972, (NSW) are substantially more innovative since permanent water transfers are permissible within the district without any
encumbrance of land transfer. The significant contrast of the Private
Irrigation Districts is that only one license covers all members of the
district, while all general water users are licensed individually by the
Water Resources Commission. Subsequently, the interests of individual
water users are determined according to the Capital shares of the facilities
within the district and it is these shares which form the basis of water
transfers.
It is interesting to note that while the Joint Water Authority and the
Private Irrigation District provide rational development for water transferability within irrigation, no mechanism exists for the transfer of water
from irrigation to other classes of water use.
TOWARDS MARKETS IN WATER
Ad hoc markets have existed in the water industry from time to time,
but only within the irrigation sector. With about three quarters of the
nation's regulated water being directed to irrigation, it is not surprising
that most of the market innovation has been in this area. It has been
general practice for irrigators to transfer water through complicated land
exchanges, with the forbearance of the state water managing authorities.
The legislative structures of Joint Water Authorities and Private Irrigation
Districts provide an alternative medium whereby irrigators could transfer
water without the encumbrance of land transfers.
The impact of current Australian water law is twofold. First, it is clear
that water transfers are possible, and second, it is seen that the water
transfers that have occurred have been in the irrigation sector only. This
second observation highlights the Australian water reallocation dilemma.
While the need is to transfer water from irrigation to the other growth
sectors, such as urban, domestic and industrial uses, the only transfers
that are permissable are those between irrigators.
At the same time, there appear to be countervailing pressures applied
to the principle of water transfer. Keeping in mind that water transfer is
possible (as in irrigation), the tradeoff is between the equity of defining
private entitlements in existing apportionments of water supply and the
public interest in administratively assigning licenses to high priority water
users.
It is evident that Australian water allocation policy is at the crossroads
with the options being either privatization or administrative control. As
Coase has suggested in the setting of minimal transaction costs (as with
a water market), the final allocation of the scarce resource (water) will
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be the same regardless of the initial pattern of use."' However, it is clear
that the current argument in Australia concerns the windfalls of the public
provision of regulated water, with little attention to transaction costs. At
the same time, the current administrative trend, emphasizing reliability
and rational prices, will threaten the capital base of irrigation, while the
new high value-adding users of water should find themselves paying the
full cost of their supply. The end result appears to be that irrigators will
be confronted with profound income disparities, while water will be
moved from irrigation to high valued domestic and industrial uses, whether
by market or by administration.

19. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. of L. & Econ. 1 (1960).

